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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
rule, characterizing it as "a legal anachronism, riddled with exceptions
...lacking the support of authority and reason."5 8 The court in Fu-
gate should have followed Gibson. The parent-child relationship does
not require the parental immunity rule, but traditional views of negli-
gence applied to parent-child actions might interfere with parental con-
trol and discipline. 9 The California court adopted a "reasonably
prudent parent test."6 Adapted from common tort notions, the test
compares the defendant's actions to those of a reasonable and prudent
parent in similar circumstances.6' Scholars have recently praised the
substitution of this test for the parental immunity rule.62
By clinging to the modified parental immunity rule of Brennecke and
Bahr, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Fugate failed to define ade-
quately the scope of the remaining immunity. The court offered little
guidance in allowing the rule to apply "under appropriate circum-
stances." The future of the parental immunity rule in Missouri is un-
certain, and Missouri courts should join other states in the movement
away from the parental immunity doctrine.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ILLEGITIMACY--OHIO INTESTATE SUC-
CESSION LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. 9hite
v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979) (per curiam).
Decedent's will devised all of decedent's property to his wife, but failed
to provide for its disposition in the event that she did not survive him.
When the will failed, decedent's administrator brought an action to de-
termine decedent's heirs-at-law, joining appellant, who claimed to be
decedent's illegitimate daughter, as one of the defendants. The probate
judge held, as a matter of law, that appellant could not inherit from
decedent's estate because of her status as an illegitimate child.' The
58. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
59. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
60. Id., 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
61. Id.
62. See, Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrier to Personal
Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 661 (1979); Note, The 'Reasonable Parent" Standard- An
lternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1976); 12 TULSA L.J. 545
(1977).
1. White v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, -, 391 N.E.2d 333, 333-34 (1979) (per curiam).
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court of appeals certified the case to the Ohio Supreme Court,2 which
affirmed the judgment and held Ohio's intestacy statutes, 3 which deny
an illegitimate child the right to inherit from the natural father unless
the father married the child's mother, formally acknowledged the child,
designated the child as an heir-at-law, adopted the child, or provided
for the child in his will, do not violate the equal protection guarantees
of either the United States4 or Ohio5 constitutions.6
At Ohio common law an illegitimate child was a "child of no one"
for purposes of inheritance.7 The Ohio legislature abrogated this doc-
trine in 1831,8 but the intestacy statutes since enacted by the legislature
continue to discriminate against illegitimate children. An illegitimate
child may inherit from and through the mother as if legitimate,9 but the
child may inherit from or through the natural father only if the father
legitimizes the child' 0 through intermarriage, formal acknowledg-
ment," or adoption,' 2 designates the child as an heir-at-law,' 3 or pro-
2. The cause was certified to the Ohio Supreme Court, pursuant to the state constitution,
OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 3(b)(4), for resolution of the conflict between the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for Franklin County in the cause subjudice and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County in Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (1974).
3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2105 (Page 1976).
4. "No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
5. "All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit. ... OHIo CONST. art. I, § 2.
6. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979) (per curiam).
7. See Blackwell v. Bowman, 150 Ohio St. 34, 80 N.E.2d 493 (1948); Lewis v. Eutsler, 4
Ohio St. 354 (1854). See generally Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. REV.
477 (1967); Stenger, The Supreme Court and Illegitimacy: 1968-1977, II FAM. L.Q. 365 (1978).
8. 1831 Ohio Laws, vol. XXIX, § 12, at 254 (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.17 (Page 1976)).
9. "Children born out of wedlock shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheritance
from and to their mother, and from and to those from whom she may inherit, or to whom she may
transmit inheritance, as if born in lawful wedlock." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.17 (Page 1976).
10. Ohio's intestate descent and distribution statute does not expressly distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate offspring, but simply refers to "children." See id. § 2105.06. Ohio,
however, historically interpreted the words "child" or "children" as legitimate children only. See
Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 104, 318 N.E.2d 397, 400-01 (1974), and cases cited
therein. The enactment of § 2105.17, see note 9 supra, extended the scope of § 2105.06 to include
an illegitimate child inheriting from and through the mother, but did not change the child's status
to legitimate. 40 Ohio App. 2d at 106, 318 N.E.2d at 401. An illegitimate child, therefore, may
inherit from or through the father under § 2105.06 only if the child is legitimated.
11. "When a man has a child by a woman and before or after the birth intermarries with her,
the child is legitimate. The issue of parents whose marriage is null in law are nevertheless legiti-
mate." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page Supp. 1978).
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vides for the child in his will.' 4  The Ohio statutory scheme also
distinguishes among illegitimate children. Illegitimate children whose
fathers have complied with one of the above procedures may inherit
from both parents, but those whose fathers have not so complied may
inherit only from their mothers.' 5  Ohio thus occupies a "middle
ground" on intestate inheritance by illegitimate children.' 6
Each type of discrimination is conceptually open to challenge, but
some Ohio courts refused to recognize the distinction between inter-
and intra-class discrimination among illegitimates. 7 The result was a
conffict among the Ohio courts on even the nature of the discrimination
involved.'"
12. The natural father of a child may file an application in the probate court .... and
upon consent of the mother. .. the probate court, if satisfied that the applicant is the
natural father, and that establishment of the relationship is for the best interest of the
child, shall enter the finding of fact upon its journal, and thereafter the child is the child
of the applicant, as though born to him in lawful wedlock.
Id.
13. A final decree of adoption and an interlocutory order of adoption that has become
final. . . create the relationship of parent and child between petitioner and the adopted
person. as if the adopted person were a legitimate blood descendent of the petitioner, for
all purposes including inheritance and applicability of statutes ....
Id. § 3107.15.
14. A person of sound mind and memory may appear before a probate judge and file a
written declaration designating another person as an heir-at-law. "Thenceforward the person des-
ignated will stand in the same relation, for all purposes, to such declarant as he could if a child
born in lawful wedlock. The rules of inheritance will be the same between him and the relations
by blood of the declarant, as if so born." Id. § 2105.15.
15. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
16. State intestacy laws vary widely on the right of illegitimate children to inherit. In a range
from intermarriage as the only basis for inheritance to the Uniform Parentage Act's much broader
bases upon which illegitimates may inherit (e.g., attempted marriage, support adjudication, or
acceptance of a child into one's home as one's own), Ohio's intestacy statutes stand midway, rec-
ognizing several alternatives by which an illegitimate child may inherit. For categorizations of
state laws governing intestate succession by illegitimates, see Stenger supra note 7, at 395 n.144;
Note, Illegitimates and Equal Protection, 10 J.L. REF. 543, 550-51 nn.50-54 (1977).
17. Compare Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 113,318 N.E.2d 397,406 (1974) (Ohio
intestacy statutes discriminate within class of illegitimates), with Moore v. Dague, 46 Ohio App.
2d 75, 80. 345 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1975) (Ohio intestacy statutes do not discriminate within class of
illegitimates).
18. See, e.g., In re Minor of Martin, 51 Ohio App. 2d 21, 365 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (equal
protection mandates that § 2105.18 allow every illegitimate child the opportunity to be legitimated
by filing application and proving identity of father); Moore v. Dague, 46 Ohio App. 2d 75, 345
N.E.2d 449 (1975) (equal protection not violated by Ohio's restrictions on inheritance by illegiti-
mates from intestate fathers); Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (1974)
(equal protection mandates that "children" in § 2105.06 include all illegitimates); Jack v. Byers, 73
Ohio Op. 2d 500 (C.P. 1975) (§ 2105.17 unconstitutional).
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In Green v. Woodard9 an Ohio appellate court accepted the distinc-
tion and declared that the discrimination among illegitimates violated
the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.20  The
court distinguished Labine v. Vincent,2' in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld, as a reasonable classification, a Louisiana in-
testacy statute22 that conditioned inheritance by illegitimates on legiti-
mation.23 The Green court reasoned that if the statute permitted some
illegitimates to inherit on the same basis as legitimates, then the equal
protection clause mandates that all illegitimates receive similar treat-
ment 24 in the absence of a rational basis for differential treatment.25
In Moore v. Dague,26 however, another Ohio appellate court rejected
Green's approach and upheld Ohio's restrictions on intestate inheri-
tance by illegitimate children. The Moore court balked at Green's
implicit conclusion that allowing illegitimates any inheritance rights
short of full rights constitutes invidious discrimination.28 The court
19. 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (1974).
20. Id. at 113-17, 318 N.E.2d at 405-08.
21. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
22. "Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who has duly ac-
knowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor
surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the State." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952).
23. Ohio App. 2d at 111-13, 318 N.E.2d at 404-05. The Louisiana statute upheld in Labine
severely limited the inheritance rights of acknowledged, but not legitimated, children of intestate
fathers. The Green court distinguished Labine on the basis that the Louisiana statute discrimi-
nated only against the class of illegitimates, not within the class itself. Id. at 112-13, 318 N.E.2d at
405. For a discussion of the Labine decision, see Stenger, supra note 7, at 372-74; Note, Patern/o,
Statutes: Thwarting Equal Protectionfor llegitimates, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 339, 352-55 (1977).
24. 40 Ohio App. 2d at 115, 318 N.E.2d at 407.
25. Id. at 116-17, 318 N.E.2d at 407-08. In re Minor of Martin, 51 Ohio App. 2d 21, 365
N.E.2d 892 (1977), drew the same conclusion regarding § 2105.18, which allows the father to
legitimate his illegitimate child through formal acknowledgment of his paternity. See note II
supra. In Martin the court held that restriction of legitimation to those illegitimate children whose
fathers choose to initiate acknowledgment proceedings invidiously discriminates against those ille-
gitimates whose fathers choose not to initiate such proceedings. Thus, the court construed
§ 2105.18 to allow the child to apply independently for legitimation on the basis of clear and
convincing proof of the father's identity. 51 Ohio App. 2d at 28-29, 365 N.E.2d at 896-97.
26. 46 Ohio App. 2d 75, 345 N.E.2d 449 (1975).
27. Id. at 83, 345 N.E.2d at 454.
28. There are two distinct classes of illegitimate children created by R.C. 2105.17. 411
illegitimate children are given the right to inherit from and through their mothers as if
they were legitimate. Under existing common law and R.C. 2105.06, all illegitimate chil-
dren are denied the right to inherit from their natural fathers by intestate succession in
the absence of some action by such natural father. R.C. 2105.17 does not create two
classes of illegitimate children but, rather, treats all illegitimate children the same.
Id. at 80, 345 N.E.2d at 452 (emphasis in original).
The Moore court, however, in finding Ohio's intestacy law similar to the Louisiana law upheld
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/19
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could find no discrimination "in the state's giving each illegitimate
child 'half a loaf rather than none," 29 and it interpreted Labine to
sanction both inter- and intra-class discrimination against illegitimate
children."
The United States Supreme Court again reviewed an intestacy stat-
ute in Trimble v. Gordon.3 The Court held that an Illinois law32 vio-
lated equal protection by allowing an illegitimate child to inherit from
the mother but not from the father, unless the father had legitimated
the child through intermarriage and acknowledgment.33 The Court
recognized two distinct types of discrimination 4 and found that Illi-
nois' exclusion of some illegitimates from intestate inheritance from
and through their fathers was overinclusive in light of an alternative
"middle ground. '35 The Court distinguished Labine on the basis of the
by the United States Supreme Court in Labine, wrote: "The two classes of illegitimate children
created are: (1) those for whom the natural father has taken the necessary steps to entitle them to
inherit from him, and (2) those for whom the natural father has taken no such steps." Id. at 81,
345 N.E.2d at 452. Ultimately, the court conceded that Ohio's law "'discriminates' between ille-
gitimate children as to [the] right of inheritance from their natural fathers," but found no invidi-
ous discrimination in the classification. Id. at 84, 345 N.E.2d at 454.
29. Id. at 81, 345 N.E.2d at 453.
30. Id. at 80-81, 345 N.E.2d at 452-53.
31. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Since 1968 the Supreme Court has frequently reviewed legislation
affecting illegitimate children. For a comprehensive discussion of these cases, see Fine & Dickson,
Famil' Law, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 239; Stenger, supra note 7; Note, supra note 16; Note,
supra note 23.
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973), provided in relevant part:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor and of any
person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an
illegitimate person shall represent such person and take by descent any estate which the
parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-
marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
33. 430 U.S. at 776. Both Labine and Trimble were five-to-four decisions. Justice Black
wrote the Labine opinion of the "transition" Court, upholding the Louisiana statute, in which
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined; Justices Brennan,
White, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Trimble Court,
invalidating the Illinois statute, in which Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined;
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackman, and Rehnquist dissented. In the recent case
of Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (plurality opinion), Justice Powell voted with the Trimble
dissenters to uphold, in yet another five-to-four decision, New York's intestacy law. See note 41
infra.
34. The Court observed that the Illinois intestate succession law "treats illegitimate children
differently from legitimate children," 430 U.S. at 733, but also emphasized "the asymmetrical
statutory discrimination against the illegitimate children of intestate men." Id. at 730.
35. Although the Court recognized that the "more serious problems of proving paternity
might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers'
estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or
Washington University Open Scholarship
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statutes at issue in the two cases, 36 but showed discomfort with the
Labine holding.37 When the Court next ruled on the subject in Laill v.
Lali,38 the Court displayed no such discomfort in upholding a New
York statute39 that barred intestate inheritance from the father by an
illegitimate unless the child produced an order of filiation obtained
during the father's lifetime.4" A plurality of the Court distinguished
Trimble and found that the New York law was substantially related to
important state interests and that it occupied the permissible "middle
ground.""1 Although its reasoning focused on interclass discrimina-
for legitimate children generally," id., it concluded: "For at least some significant categories of
illegitimate children of intestate men, inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing
the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy
laws. Because it excludes those categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily, § 12 is constitu-
tionally flawed." Id. at 771.
36. Compare LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919, supra note 22, with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2,
supra note 32. The Court wrote of the Illinois law:
The difference in the rights of illegitimate children in the estates of their mothers and
their fathers appears to be unrelated to the purpose of promoting family relationships.
In this respect the Louisiana laws at issue in Labine were quite different. Those laws
differentiated on the basis of the character of the child's illegitimacy. "Bastard children"
were given no inheritance rights. "Natural children," who could be and were acknowl-
edged under state law, were given limited inheritance rights, but still less than those of
legitimate children. The Louisiana categories are consistent with a theory of social op-
probrium regarding the parents' relationships and with a measured, if misguided, at-
tempt to deter illegitimate relationships.
430 U.S. at 768-69 n.13 (citation omitted).
37. 430 U.S. at 776 n.17. "[I]t is apparent that we have examined the Illinois statute more
critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent that our analysis
in this case differs from that in Labine the more recent analysis controls." Id.
38. 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (plurality opinion).
39. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967) provides in relevant part:
(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his issue
inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue
inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the
father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during
the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
40. 439 U.S. at 275-76.
41. Id. at 266-76. The Court remarked that the New York statute, unlike its Illinois counter-
part struck down in Trimble, bars inheritance "only where there has been a failure to secure
evidence of paternity during the father's lifetime in the manner prescribed by the State. This is
not a requirement that inevitably disqualifies an unnecessarily large number of children born out
of wedlock." Id. at 273.
The plurality in Lali further distinguished Trimble on the basis of the state interests served by
each statute. The Illinois law, wrote Justice Powell, claimed to foster both "the encouragement of
legitimate family relationships and the maintenance of an accurate and efficient method of dispos-
ing of an intestate decedent's property," but the Trimble Court found the statute's relationship to
the first interest "most attenuated" and the statute's classification overinclusive of the second inter-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/19
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tion, Justice Powell's opinion also addressed impermissible intraclass
discrimination, stating that classifications among illegitimates may
have a rational basis and therefore be valid.42
In light of Trimble and Lalli the Ohio Supreme Court in White v.
Randolph4 3 reconsidered the constitutionality of Ohio's descent and
distribution laws as they apply to illegitimate children.' Appellant
conceded that she could not meet the statutory requirements for inheri-
tance by an illegitimate child from an intestate father, but argued that
the equal protection clause afforded her a right to inherit if she could
show "with sufficient competent evidence" that decedent was actually
her father.45 The Ohio court clearly regarded the issue as intraclass,
not interclass, discrimination.46 The court examined the rationality of
est. Id. at 265. Justice Powell noted the absence in La//i of any offer to justify the New York
statute in terms of encouraging legitimate family relationships, id. 266-68, and found that the
statute adopted by New York to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death
did not extend beyond its justifiable purposes, id. at 272-76.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined Justice Powell in the opinion for the La/li
Court. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but would have overruled rather than dist-
inguished Trimble, which he viewed as a "'derelict." Id. at 276-77. Justice Rehnquist concurred in
the judgment "[for the reasons stated in his dissent in Trimble. " Id. at 276. Thus, all four of the
Trimb/e dissenters joined or concurred in the judgment in La//i. Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Stevens-who, with Justice Powell comprised the majority in Trimble-all dissented in
La/I. Only Justice Powell, therefore, actually found a distinction between the Illinois statute in
Trimble and the New York statute in La//i.
42. Id. at 272 n.9. Appellant also claimed that § 4-1.2, see note 39 supra, together with N.Y.
Dosi. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1977), which classifies as legitimate children born out of wed-
lock whose parents later intermarry, "impermissibly discriminates between classes of illegitimate
children" by substituting marriage for § 4-1.2's requirements. "Thus, these 'illegitimate' children
escape the rigors of the rule unlike their unfortunate counterparts whose parents never marry."
439 U.S. at 272 n.9. The Court responded that under § 24 one claiming to be the legitimate child
of a decedent not only must prove paternity, but also evidence maternity and intermarriage; thus,
"[tihese additional evidentiary requirements make it reasonable to accept less exacting proof of
paternity than required under § 4-1.2 and to treat such children as legitimate for inheritance pur-
poses." Id.
43. 59 Ohio St. 2d 6, 391 N.E.2d 333 (1979) (per curiam). The Ohio Supreme Court adopted
the opinion of the court below, rendered after Trimble but before Lalli.
44. The court previously had sustained the constitutionality of these statutes in Moore. See
notes 26-30 %upra nd accompanying text.
45. 59 Ohio St. 2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 334.
46. Moreover, the Ohio provisions do not discriminate between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children per se. All children may inherit from their mothers. Some illegitimate
children and all legitimate children may inherit from their fathers. The group 'discrimi-
nated against' is that class of illegitimate children whose fathers did not formally ac-
knowledge them or designate them as heirs-at-law, pursuant to R.C. 2105.18 or R.C.
2105.15.
Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 335.
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the classification in light of the legitimate state purposes advanced to
support it, and recognized substantial state interests in avoiding spuri-
ous claims and providing for the stability of land titles.47 The White
court thus concluded that Ohio's intestate scheme occupies precisely
that "middle ground" between complete exclusion and case-by-case de-
termination of paternity found acceptable under Trimble." The court
viewed Lalli as further evidence of the substantial relation between the
Ohio intestate provisions and important state interests.49
In dissent Justice Palmer argued that there was "no substantial ba-
sis" for distinguishing the Ohio statutory scheme from the Illinois law
invalidated in Trimble;5 ° rather, the statutes shared a constitutional de-
fect: "[N]either state provides any method by which the illegitimate
child may initiate any proceeding to secure parity of inheritance with
legitimate children of his father."'" Justice Palmer read the New York
statute in Lalli to avoid this defect because an illegitimate child could
secure an order of filiation during the lifetime of the father 2.5  The dis-
senting justice, therefore, concluded that the Ohio intestate statutes
deny equal protection to illegitimate children of intestate fathers.53
Following Lali, it is difficult to envision grounds upon which the
White court could have invalidated Ohio's restrictions on the rights of
illegitimate children to inherit from their intestate fathers; the New
47. Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 334-35.
48. "In conformity with the dictates of Trimble, we believe that the Ohio statutory provisions
present a reasonable middle ground for the recognition of certain categories of illegitimate chil-
dren of intestate men." Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 335.
49. Id. at-, 391 N.E.2d at 335-36.
50. Id. at-, 391 N.E.2d at 336 (Palmer, J., dissenting). Justice Palmer also contended:
The only significant difference I have been able to determine between the statutes of the
two states is that Ohio provides one additional method by which the father may recog-
nize his illegitimate child for purposes of intestate succession, viz., through a formal
proceeding in Probate Court, initiated by the father, to designate such child as his heir at
law.
Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 336 (Palmer, J., dissenting). See note 13 supra. Justice Palmer found this
difference insufficient to distinguish this case from Trimble.
51. 59 Ohio St. 2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 336 (Palmer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 337 (Palmer, J., dissenting). Justice Palmer's statement that the
New York statute upheld in La/li permitted an illegitimate child to secure an order of filiation
during the lifetime of the father is not entirely correct. The statute requires that the paternity
proceeding be instituted "during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth
of the child." See note 39 supra. The Supreme Court expressly withheld review of the constitu-
tionality of the two-year limitation in Lalli See 439 U.S. at 267 n.5 (1978). If this limitation is
valid, the New York statute does not provide a method by which an illegitimate child may initiate
paternity proceedings, and Justice Palmer's distinction is chimerical.
53. 59 Ohio St. 2d at -, 391 N.E.2d at 337.
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York law upheld in La/li is at least as restrictive as that of Ohio.5
4
White v. Randolph is nevertheless significant for its rejection of the
Green approach to intraclass discrimination among illegitimates. Had
the Green court prevailed in its requirement of a "full loaf' or "no
loaf' for illegitimates, it would have established a principle with omi-
nous implications for legislation in general. Classification is inherent
in legislation,55 and "few statutory classifications are entirely free from
the criticism that they sometimes produce inequitable results."56
54. Compare notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text with N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
55. For a discussion of legislative classification and its relation to equal protection, see
Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equali: Legislative Classications, Desegregation, and Reverse
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494, 499-533 (1977).
56. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 273 (1978).
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